Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.Some have said that this can't mean what it looks like. Was intelligence altered to fit a conclusion already reached? They point out that the Senate Intelligence Committee report says "The Committee did not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities." On the other hand, this says:
Republicans noted in the report's conclusion that no intelligence analysts had said they were pressured. But Democrats objected, saying there was ample evidence that top Bush administration officials had intimidated analysts to twist their judgments about whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.So it looks to me like an open question.
In the end, the committee decided to put off consideration of the Bush administration's use of intelligence, all but guaranteeing the issue a prominent role in the campaign.
To be honest, I don't think that the administration necessarily tried to fabricate intelligence. I think, rather, they wanted a particular conclusion and weren't afraid to say so. I could hear someone saying, "There must be a connection between Iraq and terrorists. Can't someone find the evidence for me?" They wouldn't have to say "please go make something up" for some underling to get that message.
Then there's this: Actual British People Not Confused About What "Fixed" Means. I think that pretty well decides it, but I'm sure there will still be disagreement.
There's another problem here, however, and it seems to be ignored a lot by Bush's defenders. The memo says that a war with Iraq was a foregone conclusion. They'd already decided that's what would happen. Regardless of that, President Bush kept telling Americans that he hadn't made up his mind. That's the real lie revealed by the Downing Street memo, but all I hear the right talk about is the case for weapons of mass destruction. When did President Bush decide to attack Iraq, and why?
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I'll see if I can find the linkage, but until I do, two thoughts:
"Fixed around" is not the same thing as "fixed". In other words, the Bush administration was going through the intelligence data as you might a buffet table. A little bit of nuclear proliferation, a dab of WMD, perhaps a dollop of ties to al Quaida. Now, there were dissenting opinions as to these intelligence data (a casserole of total disarmament, a salad of no terror ties, etc) - but intelligence is a messy game. There are rarely hard and fast absolutes - and so it is fairly normal (as I understand it) to go with what is more likely.
In this case, we knew that he possessed WMDs at one point (since we sold them), and pretty much every country spent the 1990's telling each other how bad Saddam was, and how much evil he was wanting to do. So, Occam's Razor (and human nature) would indicate that intelligence which indicated this is more probable than intelligence which indicated otherwise.
Second (finally): IIRC, there was a 1998 Senate resolution in which the US Senate voted, as a matter of foreign policy, for regime change in Iraq. If this is correct, then any President (either Clinton, or the winner of 2000) should have been putting together a plan to do this. It might have been through pressure in the UN, it might have been through overt military action, whatever. Personally, if I had been elected President, I would have thought about taking care of Iraq as well - I'd certainly come into office with plans for possible military action in Iraq, Iran, N. Korea, China, etc. The military has those in place (as well as an invasion plan for Canada and England, I imagine. It pays to be prepared, just in case.)
Anyway, while it might seem a tad suprising that the decision was in place, it shouldn't be. It was almost a given that the UN wouldn't do anything more forceful than pass another resolution - which Saddam was likely to ignore as well.
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